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Abstract: Credentials play an important role in all modern societies, but the
analysis of their nature and function has thus far been neglected by social phi-
losophers. We present a view according to which the defining function of cre-
dentials is to certify the identity and the institutional status (including certain
rights) of individuals. More importantly, credentials enable rights-holders to ex-
ercise their rights, so that for a particular right to be exercisable the right-holder
should possess, carry and sometimes show to an authority a document of a specific
kind. Driving licenses, identity cards, passports, boarding passes, library passes,
credit cards, ATM cards, health insurance cards are all examples of credentials in
this sense. Credentials have in every case a bearer, and the bearer should be able to
carry them easily on his or her person. Credentials should also be inspectable – not
least because credentials can be forged. The authors analyze several historical and
contemporary examples of credentials, focusing on the credentials carried by the
pilgrims of the Way of Saint James.
Keywords: credentials, document acts, deontic powers, Way of Saint James,
institutional objects, status indicators
1 Introduction
Credentials are documents we are required to have in our possession in order to
achieve certain ends. For instance identity cards, driving licenses, passports,
credit cards. A credential in this sense is, for example, a boarding pass which we
need to board a plane, or the machine-readable access badge we need in order to
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gain entry to the building where wework, or the supermarket club card we use for
shopping.1 In some countries, at least, police controls are mounted to check that
persons are carrying the requisite identity documents when passing through
certain areas, and similar controls are mounted at airports and international
borders.
Credentials are currently made largely of paper or plastic. But in a process that
is only now beginning to gain traction, many of the paper and plastic documents
we have become accustomed to using as credentials are being replaced by elec-
tronic documents stored inside our phones. The credentials themselves survive,
but now in electronic form. And we will still need to carry them around with us
even after the point where our wallet has been replaced by a wallet app.2 In what
follows, therefore we use the term “credential” to refer equally to both paper and
plastic documents and their digital substitutes.3
What follows is an exploration of the ontology of credentials, and of the acts
that we perform with their aid. As we shall see, people use documents not only to
store, display and transmit information but also to bring about a variety of further
ends. Credentials thereby extend the scope of what we can achieve through the
performance of mere speech acts. We follow Smith (2011 and 2014) in calling such
performative uses of documents “document acts”.4 And as we shall also see, cre-
dentials often fulfill simultaneously a variety of purposes.
1 Other examples of credentials are library cards, parking passes, bus passes, conference
badges, bank savings books, national insurance cards, boating licenses, pension books, gun
licenses, the French livret de famille, sheriff’s badges, military rank insignia, and doctor’s
prescriptions.
2 See Smith (2014).
3 Thus, not all the documents that we are required to carry are credentials. In Italy, for instance,
to combat tax fraud customers are required to retain the receipt in their possession upon leaving
a restaurant. This is in order to allow it to be checked by the tax authorities, who for this purpose
subject restaurant customers to random searches. Failure to present the receipt would result in a
fine on the part of both customer and restaurant owner. Here, possession of the receipt does not
bestow any right upon the possessor; rather it provides protection against being subject to a
fine.
4 By ‘document act’ Smith (2014, 19) means “what humans (or other agents) do with documents,
ranging from signing or stamping them, or depositing them in registries, to using them to grant or
withhold permission, to establish or verify identity, or to set down rules for declaring a state of
martial law.” According to Smith, “acts of these sorts deal with documents in ways which reflect
the status of the latter as documents (rather than as, for example, mere pieces of paper). Thus the
coverage domain of the theory of document acts does not include, for example, burning old
manuscripts to keep warm”.
2 B. Smith et al.
2 What are Credentials?
The term “credential” derives from the medieval Latin “credentialis”, meaning
“giving credence to” (from the Latin “credo” – “I believe”).5 The Oxford English
Dictionary defines “credential” as a “document or certificate proving a person’s
identity or qualifications”.
Credentials are not solely linguistic artifacts (indeed we shall see that they are
in some cases wordless, see section 3.3). In addition to the information they
convey, they also have a material substratum that plays an essential role in the
performance of the document acts in which they are involved. This is because, as
we shall see, the possession of and control over a material object is a felicity
condition (in Austin’s sense) of the associated document acts.6 Thematerial object
may serve in this capacity either through being offered for inspection, as when you
hand your passport to the border control officer, or by serving as the channel for
signals, as when you hold your watch over the QR code scanner at the gate when
entering a secure area.7
Yet althoughwe need to prove our status as rights-holders using credentials in
order to enjoy the associated rights, it is not the credentials themselves that provide
us with those rights. Credentials are not “status-making” or “rights-making”.
Indeed, to follow the terminology proposed by Hohfeld (1919), credentials provide
us with certain legal advantages; for example, your passport confers new advan-
tages when a visa stamp has been entered.
Because credentials typically have nothing to do with the genesis of the rights
they grant to their possessor, they are connected not with the having of a right but
rather with the exercise thereof. It is generally a necessary condition of acquiring a
credential that one possess already the right that the credential certifies. It is impor-
tant here to distinguish between “being the holder of a right” and “having the deontic
5 Curiously, the term ‘document’ has a very similar etymology, since it comes from the Latin
“documentum”, meaning proof or demonstration. The expression “documentum dare” means “to
provide proof” or “to demonstrate”. On documents as instruments of verification, see Immorlica
et al. (2019).
6 By “possession” we mean the material possession of something, which is to say: the state of
having somethingwith you or under your control. “Material possession” connotes a simple factual
relation between a person and a thing, as contrasted with the legal meaning of “possession”,
which connotes a person’s having a legal power over a thing.
7 Issuing bus or theater or plane tickets is not just a way of allowing the exercise of rights, but also
a way of coordinating the plans of many people, for example, by ensuring that seats are still
available when they arrive.
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power to exercise that right concretely”.8 A right such as freedom of movement may
long pre-exist the emergence of credentials that enable the exercise of that right.
The right to travel, for example, is commonly guaranteed by both national and
international legislation. For instance,Article 16.2 of the Italian Constitution provides
that “Every citizen is free to leave the territory of the Republic and return to it,
notwithstanding any legal obligations”.9 Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights provides that “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom ofmovement and
residence within the borders of each State. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and to return to his country”. But it is nowadays only the
possession of a passport or other similar credentials that gives the possibility to
exercise these rights concretely.10 If you temporarily losepossessionof yourpassport,
then certainly your constitutional right to travel will not, for that reason, disappear.
Rather, you will only temporarily not be able to exercise it. Even if your passport is
lost or stolen while you are abroad, this does not mean that you are trapped in a
foreign country forever because it is no longer possible for you to cross national
borders. This is because it is possible to request and obtain a replacement credential.
Credentials are documents that can be replaced after a process of legitimation.
2.1 Credentials as Status Indicators
As the OED definition of credential makes clear, since a credential is a “document
or certificate proving a person’s identity or qualifications” they mainly perform an
“epistemic function”. In this sense, if we use Searle’s lexicon, they can be
considered “status indicators”.11 Moreover Searle (1995, 210) explicitly mentions
8 Following Searle (1995, 100; 2010, 8f), deontic powers are conventional powers that regulate
relations between people. Searle includes in this category rights, responsibilities, obligations,
duties, privileges, entitlements, penalties, authorizations, permissions, “and other such deontic
phenomena”.
9 See Article 23 of the Treaty of Rome on “The Functioning of the European Union” (1957). On this
topic, see Muchmore (2004, 328).
10 “Every citizen is free to enter the territory of the Italian Republic and to go out of the territory of
the Italian Republic, without prejudice to legally imposed obligation, using a valid passport or a
passport substitute document” (from Law no. 1185, 1967, article 1; our translation. Italics added).
11 This feature distinguishes credentials frommoney. Indeed,money is an object of exchange and
not an instrument that certifies already existing deontic powers. It is not a status indicator: it is
(according to Searle, at least) a status function (Searle 2017). In ontologically more careful terms,
an amount of physical money is a deontic artifact that confers powers. Money is not a credential
mainly for two reasons: (i) banknotes do not certify anything, they do not say anything about their
bearer; (ii) it is true that, as Searle (1995) claims, money gives us a deontic power, but, unlike
credentials, it is impossible to exercise the deontic power only by showing a banknote or a coin. If
you want to buy something you need to deliver/hand over the money to the seller.
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some kinds of credential as examples of status indicators (uniforms, passports,
driver’s licenses).
According to Searle (1995, 119), the status indicators are “official representa-
tions” required by institutional facts, “because the existence of institutional facts
cannot in general be read off from brute physical facts of the situation”. As stated
by Searle (2006, 21–22): “in order for status functions to be recognized, there
typically have to be some sort of status indicators, because there is nothing in the
man or the object itself that will indicate its status, since the status is only there by
collective acceptance or recognition. Thus, we have policemen’s uniforms, wed-
ding rings, marriage certificates and passports, all of which are status indicators.”
Status indicators document institutional realities. They make them evident
and recognizable, without creating by themselves the institutional reality they
represent. Nevertheless, they perform an important role also from the ontological
point of view: for instance, according to Searle, “the uniform does not constitute
being a policeman, but it does symbolize a status-function; and that symboliza-
tion, in some form or other, is essential to the existence of the status-function”.12 If
institutional realities exist in virtue of social recognition, then the tools/in-
struments that make it possible for us to recognize these realities also play a role in
maintaining them in existence. In this sense, “collective recognition is not enough.
There has to be official recognition by some agency, itself supported by collective
recognition, and there have to be status indicators issued by the official agency”
(Searle 2005, 15).
Searle’s analysis of status indicators neglects two further important features of
this epistemic function. First, that status indicators are also physical entities. And
second, that many status indicators play an important role also in the realm of
deontic powers. Searle does not realize that those status indicators which are
credentials do not only perform an epistemic function (a “status-indicating func-
tion”) and the indirect ontological functions mentioned above. They also have the
deontic function identified in this paper, namely of making it “possible to exercise
a certain right concretely”.13
12 Searle (2006, 22) writes: “Many societies find that they [the status functions] cannot exist
without status indicators, as, for example, the proliferation of identity cards and driver’s licenses
will attest.”
13 Credentials do not give you a new (second-order) legal right to exercise a (first-order) right.
Rather, what they give you is just a de facto deontic power to exercise a (first-order) right. Searle
comes closest to this insight, when, speaking of Hernando de Soto’s highly influential exploitation
of the powers of those particular status indicators that are property deeds in developing countries,
he asserts that “sometimes the status indicators acquire a kind of life of their own” (Searle 2006,
22). See de Soto (2000).
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In conclusion: we can say that all credentials are also status indicators, but not
all status indicators are also credentials (for example, wedding rings are status
indicators but not also credentials).
2.2 Credentials as Institutional Objects
Credentials can be either valid or invalid. This is because credentials are not mere
brute objects, but institutional objects. By institutional objects we mean material
thingswith features that exist only in virtue of a systemof constitutive rules (Searle
1969 and Znamierowski 1924) and thus only in the context of institutions
(Anscombe 1958 and Searle 1969).14 The type of each institutional object is deter-
mined by its associated constitutive rules. Examples of institutional objects are: a
banknote, a check, a chess piece, playing cards, a traffic sign, a testament
(document), a contract (document), a ballot paper, a commercial invoice, a receipt,
a graduation diploma, a promissory note, a stone border, identity cards, passports,
driving licenses, traffic lights, and so on.
Within the system of constitutive rules that make credentials possible, there
are constitutive rules of a particular type, that establish conditions of validity for
the entities in question (for example, “The ticket must be validated (a) by being
punched in the machine (b) before boarding the train”).15 Conte (1997) introduced
the term “anankastic-constitutive rules” for rules of this type.16
Some anankastic-constitutive rules impose limits on activities that require
credentials, for instance, rules establishing credential-related conditions on
certain acts, for example of crossing a border (crosser must carry a passport),
traveling by car (driver must carry a driver’s license), and so on. As we have seen,
the possession of a credential gives us the deontic power to exercise one or more
associated rights. However, at the same time, the anankastic-constitutive rules
associated with that right set limits to its exercise.
14 On Znamierowski’s social ontology, see Lorini and Żełaniec (2016).
15 See Searle (1969); Gizbert-Studnicki (1975); Lorini (2000).
16 More precisely, by anankastic-constitutive rules Conte means rules that set a necessary con-
dition for the validity of what they regulate (for example, the rule that establishes that a signature
is a necessary condition of validity for a will). Anankastic-constitutive rules are different in kind
fromSearle's constitutive rules. Indeed,whereas the latter create new types of institutional entities
and therefore make possible new institutional phenomena, the former presuppose the institu-
tional types created by Searle’s constitutive rules and state validity’s conditions for the institu-
tional tokens of these types. Anankastic-constitutive ruleswork at the level of felicity of acts, to use
J.L. Austin’s terminology. For an investigation on anankastic-constitutive rules see Lorini (2017).
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In addition, credentials themselves can exercise their function only if they
fulfill certain conditions of validity set by the anankastic-constitutive rules. For
example, where credentials have an expiration date they cannot exercise their
function if they have expired.17
2.3 Counterfeiting Credentials
As we have seen, each type of credential is associated with a specific type of
institutional state of affairs, for example the granting of a right of the corre-
sponding type. You are awarded a degree certificate only after you have acted in
accordance with all the appropriate procedures, including passing all necessary
examinations and receiving the degree. One way in which a (putative) credential
may be invalid is because it was not issued in accordance with the appropriate
procedures because of departures from these procedures on the side of either the
issuer, or the receiver, or both.
In the case of forged credentials the associated institutional state of affairs
typically does not obtain. A forged credential is either a new or a modified artifact
designed to look like an authentic credential. Authentic credentials can also be
used in illegal ways, for example when a twin uses the driving license of his
brother.18
Many techniques have been devised to prevent the forgery of credentials
through the use of signatures, through complex and multiply redundant sets of
identifying numbers, bar codes or RFID chips, through graphics and photographic
and holographic images, and through stamps or seals (which are institutional
objects imprinted upon or attached to other institutional objects). Graphic devices
can also be used to confer newdeontic powers on the possessor of a credential or to
17 Certain credentials can have some of their functions exercised even if they are no longer
formally valid. A first example is the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), which allows its
possessor to receivemedical treatment even in another EUmember state if this becomesmedically
necessary. But it can be used even after its expiry date to certify personal data, for instance when
using cigarette- or alcohol-vending machines. A second example is documented in the Italian
Presidential Decree no. 445, 28 December 2000 (D.P.R. 445/2000), according to which it is not
necessary to produce certifications to attest to one’s citizenship, personal data, ormarital status; it
will be sufficient to exhibit a valid ID document. The data will be recorded by acquiring a
photocopy of the ID document. It is possible to exhibit an expired document if the subject declares
in a note on the photocopy that the data certified by the document are unchanged.
18 A famous example of this illegal use of credentials is the case of the Berlin shoemaker,
documented in Carl Zuckmeyer’s play The Captain of Köpenick, who “confiscated”more than 4000
marks from a municipal treasury while wearing a Prussian military uniform with a captain’s
insignia. See Kelsen, ([1934]1992, 9).
On Credentials 7
provide a historical or forensic trail of the functions fulfilled by the credential
through time (for example, the hole punched in a bus ticket).
2.4 Credentials as Bearer-dependent, Portable, Inspectable
Documents
Connection to a bearer, portability and inspectability are three fundamental
characteristics of a credential. Connection means that each credential is con-
nected to its own specific bearer;19 portability that the bearer should be able to
carry the credential easily on his or her person20 (thus that it be small and
light);21,22 inspectability requires that the credential can be made publicly visible
(to a human being, barcode scanner, chip reader). All three characteristics can be
realized by wearing the credential, for example as a badge or as attached to a
lanyard around one’s neck. Generally, credentials should also be immediately
recognizable and identifiable as being a credential of the relevant type. Typo-
graphical and graphical features of the document are designed to make it easily
and immediately identifiable in a single glance, even by someone who does not
understand the language of the text written on them.
3 Toward a Typology of Credentials
3.1 Bearer Credentials versus Identifying Credentials
In the typology of credentials we can distinguish, first, between bearer credentials
and identifying credentials. The former does not carry any specific information
about the possessor. Examples are a bearer bond, a bus ticket, an (unintelligent)
19 Indeed, some credential (such as credit cards and bus tickets) can be shared, for example
between family members.
20 We ignore here artifacts such as car registration plates and mussel stickers, which serve as
credentials not for persons but for inanimate objects such as cars or boats.
21 Portability (the ability to carry) goes hand in hand with the requirement to carry; the latter,
however, may be subject to qualified exceptions. In the US, for example, drivers are required to
carry their driving licenses whenever they drive; but failure to carry is at worst a minor offense if a
valid license is produced within a reasonable period.
22 Portability is commonly considered to be an intrinsic characteristic also of money. An inter-
esting counterexample, documented in Furness, ([1903]2005), is the Rai, or stone money, which
are large, circular stone disks used as money in the island of Yap. These stones are too large to
move; buying an item with one simply involves agreeing that the ownership of the Rai has
changed.
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hotel keycard that allows entrance into a specific room or area of the hotel (a
keycard of this type plays the same role as a password).23
Identifying credentials carry specific data concerning their possessor. Thus
where generally, for a bearer credential, simple possession is sufficient to prove
entitlement,24 for an identifying credential possession is necessary but not suffi-
cient, since the bearer must in this case be identifiable, on the basis of what is
indicated on the credential, as the person whose credential it is.
Identifying credentials often include graphical elements, some of which
– including fingerprints, photographs, or signatures – serve alongside de-
scriptions of identifyingmarks to anchor the credential to some specific person and
thereby allow the validation of the legitimacy of the bearer. A signature is part of
both the textual and graphical content of an identifying credential because it is
composed of signs representing letters of the alphabet that also have a peculiar
graphic form that identifies its author (Harris 2000).
Legitimation can consist merely in determining the authenticity of the
credential (through a set of techniques that are connected to the design of its
material substratum). Or it can involve comparison of the data appearing on the
credential with the corresponding features of its bearer (this process may also
involve calling up data from a central registry. Where some talk of knowledge by
acquaintance and knowledge by description (Russell 1910), the type of knowledge
achieved in the latter case, which combines aspects of each of these, might best be
called knowledge by comparison. The type of knowledge achieved purely through
appeal to the fact that the credential is in the immediate physical possession of the
bearer might be called knowledge by co-localization.25
3.2 Credential Templates versus Credentials Proper
Second, we can distinguish between credential templates (which need to be filled
in), and complete credentials (credentials proper), which are the result of such
filling in.26 This distinction turns on the fact that many sorts of credentials consist
of two sorts of (textual or graphical) content: content that is compulsorily provided
for all instances of credentials of the given type; and content that is added in each
specific instance. The latter is used to fill in the cells left blank in the former. For
23 Both usernames and passwords are nowadays commonly referred to as “credentials”.
24 A keycard or a bus ticket can of course be stolen. In that case, it is being used in order to prove
something that is not true. The reason for stealing a bearer credential is that it gives the possibility
to perform illegally the act that the lawful holder of the credential could perform legally.
25 The idea of co-localization is elaborated by Stjernfelt (2019), who draws in turn on Peirce.
26 The template is ‘unsaturated’ in the terminology of Frege (1952).
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traditional types of credentials, the template27 is typically printed; for electronic
credentials it is hard-wired into the system through which credentials are
generated.
3.3 Credentials with Displayed Text versus Credentials
without Displayed Text
Third, we distinguish between credentials with displayed text, and credentials
without displayed text. The root of this distinction turns on the fact that credential
documents are still, in our common thinking, assumed to be a textual, linguistic
documents, i. e., to include some visually displayed text that specifies the docu-
ment’s function and the bearer’s identity. However, some credentials do not show
any textual content of this sort. The ink patterns created by the re-entry hand
stamps used by organizers of festivals and other special events are examples of
credentials without displayed text – wordless credentials – of this sort.
Further examples are badges allowing entry to a building, which may show
just a picture representing the bearer. There are also wordless credentials whose
specific design contains elements taken from a generally acknowledged symbol-
ogy, for example the insignia of rank used on uniforms. Others contain coded
content which enables them to activate some specific devices, for example a QR
code on a dog collar or an electronic access badge, where the badge reader checks
that the badge information is included in the table of authorized badges in the
application program and returns a command to open the electronic access badge
lock (Champlain 2003, 111–112). Here the credential performs not only a deontic
function, but also a forcing function (Norman 2013) or what Searle calls a causal
function (Searle 1995, 2010).28
27 The term ‘template’ possibly derives from the French templet, meaning: weaver’s stretcher. The
more general meaning “pattern or gauge for shaping a piece of work” is first recorded in 1819
(Oxford English Dictionary).
28 By “forcing functions” Norman (2013, 141) means “strong constraints that can prevent inap-
propriate behavior”. Forcing functions work on the basis of the mere physical structure of the
associated artifact. For example, “[s]tarting a car has a forcing function associated with it — the
driver must have some physical object that signifies permission to use the car. In the past, it was a
physical key to unlock the car doors and also to be placed into the ignition switch, which allowed
the key to turn on the electrical system and, if rotated to its extreme position, to activate the
engine”. A similar definition is that of causal function proposed by Searle. By causal function
Searle (1995, 41) means a function that can be performed by an object (for example, a nutcracker)
solely by virtue of its physical structure.
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Table 1 combines the first and last of these distinctions.
4 The Functions of Credentials
Credentials serve to make someone (or some machine) believe that some propo-
sition is true (this is their epistemic function). But they also fulfill a range of
different deontic functions, which makes them in some ways analogous to per-
formatives in the realm of speech acts.29 In the simplest case they enable their
possessor to exercise certain deontic powers – for example gaining access to a
certain area. In a more complex case a credential may have the function to prevent
the exercise of rights by enabling discrimination between different classes of
persons. The possession of these negative credentials is not a condition for the
exercise of a right but eases the imposition of burdens and obligations by an
authority (recall the Nazi Judenstern, or the yellow ticket used as substitute
passport for prostitutes in the Russian Empire).
In a way, credentials are “deontic artifacts” (like, for instance, traffic signs,
roundabouts and traffic lights) since they are material objects that play a deontic
role in a way that is intelligible to their (human or machine) addressees (see Lorini
and Moroni 2020b).
4.1 Performing Document Acts with Credentials
We can now classify the different kinds of document acts performedwith the aid of
credentials according to the way they are performed:
Table : Four Types of Credentials.
Credentials Bearer Identifying
with displayed text bearer bonds passports
ID cards
credit cards
bearer shares
share warrants
without displayed text military rank insignia a credential without text, but with
a picture identifying its
bearer and a graphical logo
of the issuing institution
hand stamps (to
regain access to an
event)
29 A credential itself may perhaps be considered as a kind of performative object. See Strother
(2000).
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i. thetic document acts (from the Greek thésis/θέσις, meaning: position-creation),
which are performed by creating new documents, for instance by issuing a
passport or ID card;30
ii. epideictic document acts (from the Greek epideiknumi/ἐπιδείκνυμι, meaning: to
exhibit), which are performed by exhibiting already existing documents, for
instance producing a passport to cross a border legally;
iii. anairetic document acts (from the Greek anairesis/ἀναίρεσις, meaning:
destruction), which are performed through the destruction of the material
substratum of a document,31 for instance when an official destroys a passport
to prevent a person from leaving the country.32
Where thetic document acts have acts such as promising as counterparts in the
speech act realm, epideictic document acts correspond to acts such as entering a
password, and anairetic document acts correspond to acts of forgiving a debt or
waiving a claim.
4.2 Deontic Functions and Causal Functions of Credentials
In general, credentials have a primary deontic function that typically emerges
already in the name of the corresponding credential type. We note that a function
that is primary for credentials of one type can be secondary for those of another
type. For instance, the primary deontic function of an ID card is to allow its bearer
to be identified. However, an Italian driving license, because it includes a photo-
graph of the citizen and a stamp or signature from the issuing state administration,
can also be used (in Italy) as a substitute ID Card.33
30 Sometimes the creation of a new document goes hand in hand with the creation of a new
“social object such as an easement or an award of damages. Some documents play both a
recording and an object-generating role. The issuance of a paper guarantee, for instance, brings a
certain sort of right into existence and provides evidence of this right in the future” (Koepsell and
Smith 2014, 222).
31 The distinction between thetic and anairetic performative acts is due to A. G. Conte (1994). See
also M.-E. Conte (1985).
32 Destroying a document is in this case not a merely physical act (like destroying a physical
object out of rage or by accident), for it is an act performed because of its legal consequence (for
instance in Italy destruction of one’s ATM card is part of the procedure to close a bank account).
Another example: in 1520, Luther launched his revolt against Catholicism by burning his bull of
excommunication, the Decretals of Clement VI, and other Church documents with which he
disagreed.
33 Circular 300/A/744/13/101/3/3/9 of the Ministry of Interior, Department of Public Security on
Title IV of the Highway Code (dated January 25, 2013).
12 B. Smith et al.
As will be clear from such examples, credentials can simultaneously fulfill
both causal and deontic functions. The same goes for a paper bus ticket, whose
typographic or graphical features as identified by a physical (human or electronic)
scanner allow you (in both the deontic and causal senses of ‘allow’) to board the
bus.
5 History of Credentials
5.1 Pre-History of Credentials
Documents contributed crucially to the development of modern civilization (de
Soto 2000; Ferraris 2014; Koepsell and Smith 2014), and they played a significant
role in this respect already in the Middle Ages, for example in the thousands of
peasants’ charters described by Clanchy (1993) representing the granting to En-
glish smallholders of title to their land (Smith 2014).
However, the phenomenon of credentials almost certainly dates back much
earlier, to the invention of writing itself. For example, in the eighteenth century BC
the kings of Mesopotamia adopted a pass system to control the movements of
people in their kingdom. Indeed, according to Charpin (2010, 218) many texts
indicate that at that time
individuals couldnotmove about unless theywere in possessionof a pass in goodorder. After
amajor invasionof locusts struck the district of Qattunam, in the northernpart of the kingdom
of Mari, the local governor quoted the order he had received from the sovereign: ‘Any private
individual [muškēnum] whowants to leavewithout your permission for the land of Subartum,
stop him and have him brought to me’.
The use of credentials for traveling outside a kingdom is also mentioned in the
Bible. In the book Nehemiah, which dates back to the fifth century BC, Nehemiah
asks the Persian kingArtaxerxes to be providedwith letters of safe passage in order
to allow her to cross safely through foreign territories.34
In Roman times, persons traveling on official business were issued with a
tractorium (a letter) in the name of the Emperor. From the Middle Ages until the
34 These are Nehemiah’s words: “If it pleases the king, may I have letters to the governors of
Trans-Euphrates, so that they will provideme safe-conduct until I arrive in Judah? Andmay I have
a letter to Asaph, keeper of the royal park, so he will giveme timber to make beams for the gates of
the citadel by the temple and for the city wall and for the residence I will occupy?’And because the
gracious hand of my God was on me, the king granted my requests. So I went to the governors of
Trans-Euphrates and gave them the king’s letters. The king had also sent army officers and cavalry
with me.” (Nehemiah 2: 7–9).
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eighteenth century it wasmainly civil authoritieswho granted credentials to satisfy
their needs in controlling their territories, in addition to satisfying the needs of
travelers. China and Japan started to develop systems of external passports only
rather late, since until the nineteenth century they were nations with little interest
in international exchange. They too, however, made extensive use of credentials
for internal control, since every traveler had to obtain permission to travel from the
local lord (Lloyd 2005, 81).
5.2 The Way of Saint James
One lesson that we can learn from the above is that credentials often play multiple
roles simultaneously. A single document act performedwith the aid of a credential
– for example signing one’s passport – can serve multiple performative ends. The
phenomenon is illustrated particularly clearly by a still surviving Christian tradi-
tion dating back to the Middle Ages, namely the Peregrinatio Compostellana (in
English: Way of Saint James), a network of pilgrimages starting out from various
points in Europe and converging on the grave of the Apostle James in Santiago de
Compostela in north-western Spain.
The earliest records of pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela date from the
time immediately after the discovery of Saint James’ grave in 813, and the latterwas
to become one of the most renowned termini of medieval pilgrimages, achieving
between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries an importance comparable to Jeru-
salem and Rome. The most common aim of the pilgrim was (and remains today) to
receive the forgiveness of sins that is granted upon completion of the pilgrimage.
The latter has over the centuries increasingly taken on the form of a document act
performed with the aid of the religious authorities. This involves a presentation by
the pilgrim at the Cathedral in Santiago of (1) him- or herself, together with (2)
documents attesting to the fact that the pilgrim had arrived at this destination
through an approved route and means.
In addition to its religious-spiritual features, the act of pilgrimage also has
social, legal and institutional features in virtue of which the pilgrimage came to be
associatedwithmultiple documents attesting for example to the fact that a traveler
has completed the pilgrimage. Such proof of completion might be required for
example because during certain periods pilgrimages – not only to Santiago de
Compostela but also to Rome or to the Holy Land – were imposed on believers as
penitential exercises (Granero Gallegos 2010).
In the Middle Ages, the civil authorities were concerned to dissuade vaga-
bondage, and so especially foreign travelers on the pilgrimage routes had to
provide a confirmable justification for their journeys. Attestation of status was
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needed further because pilgrims enjoyed privileges such as access to hostels
set along thewayby religious and civil institutions to ensure “a coordinated supply
of food, shelter, transport and other facilities” (Stopford 1994). The hostels served
also in the process of certifying the pilgrims’ progression along their routes.
Initially, a simple verbal declaration was considered sufficient to prove the
status of pilgrim. Later the increasing number of false pilgrimsmade necessary the
creation of pilgrim’s credentials. These were originally quite rudimentary; they
could consist in a peculiar outfit, typical of pilgrims, or in the possession of a
scallop shell.
The book V (chapter XI) of the Codex Calixtinus, an early guide for the pilgrims
of Santiago likely compiled between 1139 and 1173 (Pinto Costa 2016), focuses on
how peregrinos were to be treated when met along the way. Specifically, when a
believer meets a pilgrim, the latter “must be received charitably and respected by
all peoples. For whoever will take them in and diligently procure hospitality for
them, will be hosting not only St James but even the Lord Himself.” On the other
hand, the Codex also describes sanctions for violators: “Many havemet with God’s
anger because they did notwant to look after pilgrims to St James and the needy.”35
In spite of this, however, the advantages granted to pilgrimswere from the very
beginning exploited by beggars and other sorts of false pilgrims. The pilgrims thus
needed to find ways to identify themselves as “real” pilgrims to the monks, sol-
diers, and monk-soldiers that were required to support them.
The evolution of the pilgrims’ signs of recognition, reconstructed by Dunn
(Dunn 2016), is significant to our understanding of both the historical evolution and
the ontological characteristics of credentials. From around 1000, the “real” pilgrim
received in the course of an ecclesiastical service two symbols of pilgrimage, a staff
and a satchel, which had been blessed by the Churchwith a particular formula.36 As
stated by Dunn (2016, 16), “[t]he Church, through these signs, became the arbiter in
what constituted a ‘real’ pilgrim, providing a visual representation for the world to
see of the inner, invisible dedication of the traveler to a holy shrine”.
However, it was easy to falsify these rudimentary certifications, and so,
beginning in the thirteenth century, they were replaced with cartas probatorias
(evidentiary letters) (Granero Gallegos 2010). King Phillip II of Spain issued in 1590
a “Decree Against Those Who Walk About in Pilgrim Garb”, according to which
35 Sanctions manifested themselves for example in the form of houses being set on fire.
36 This is the text of that formula: “In the name of Our Lord Jesus Christ, accept the purse, this
symbol of your pilgrimage, that you may be worthy to arrive chastened and cleansed at the
threshold of St. James. […] Accept this staff as a support for the journey and for the labor on the
route of your pilgrimage, so that you may be able to overcome all the throngs of the enemy and
arrive securely at the threshold of Saint James.” (Dunn 2016, 15).
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each pilgrim had to carry two documents proving his peculiar status: one from the
ecclesiastic and one from the civil authority. The latter certified both the physical
description of the pilgrim (so that the person carrying the license could be rec-
ognisable) and the itinerary he was required to follow (Dunn 2016).
When crossing into Spain pilgrims accordingly had both to register themselves
with local civic officials and to present a letter from their home religious authorities
testifying to their status as “real” pilgrims.
5.3 Present-day Pilgrim Credentials
Today, pilgrims receive a passport-type document issued by the Church author-
ities that provides evidence of their completion of each step of their journey
(Figure 1).37 This, however, is a very recent idea. Only in 1987was theCredencial de
Peregrino created and approved by the first Congreso Internacional de Asocia-
ciones de Amigos de Santiago, held in the Pyrenean town of Jaca, near the border
with France (Dunn 2016, 26).
There are two documents connected with the pilgrimage to Compostela: the
Pilgrim’s Credential, and the Compostela, which is the document that the pilgrim
receives from the religious authority at the end of his Camino.38
TheCredential has the function both of proving that the owner has the status of
a pilgrim and, through the presence of stamps, of certifying that the pilgrim has
reached those destinations specified as a necessary condition for the achievement
of the Compostela.
The Compostela is the accreditation of the completion of the pilgrimage, and is
obtainable only after satisfying the set of requirements (thus: anankastic-
constitutive rules) established in Santiago during the Jornadas sobre el Año
Santo39 in November 1993. These are also listed on the credential itself, namely:
(i) the pilgrimage is motivated by Christian sentiment (devotionis affectu, voti vel
pietatis causa); (ii) the pilgrim reaches the Tomb of the Apostle after traversing at
least the last 100 km on foot or on horseback, or the last 200 km by bicycle and the
last km on foot; (iii) the Credential itself is issued by a Church-authorized
institution.40
37 A similar document is issued at the special terminal created at Jeddah Airport to Muslims
performing the obligations of the hajj. This document, however, is issued in exchange for the
pilgrim’s original passport, which is returned upon completion of the hajj.
38 A third document, the Testimonium, could be obtained after completion of the “reverse”
pilgrimage from Santiago back to Rome.
39 In Santiago the Holy Year is celebrated when the Feast of St. James (July 25) falls on a Sunday.
40 See https://oficinadelperegrino.com/en/pilgrimage/the-credencial/ last accessed 5/15/2020.
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Interestingly, certain maps too, and also yellow signs posted along the official
routes, can play an important documentary role for pilgrims (Dunn 2016, 22). The
latter serve not merely as aids to navigation but also as normative drawings (Lorini
2019;Lorini andMoroni 2020a;Moroni andLorini 2017) in the sense that theyprovide
instructions which have the force of obligation (Smith 2013). The pilgrim is for
example forbidden to deviate from the prescribed route formore than 12miles in any
Figure 1: Two Examples of Pilgrim’s Credentials (The first is a Credential Proper, the second is a
Credential Template).
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direction. Themap establishes the sequence of places that the pilgrim has to visit in
order to receive in his Credencial the stamps needed to achieve the Compostela.
6 Conclusions
Curiously, the analysis of credentials has been neglected by social philosophers,
including those working in the field of social ontology, and we here provide a first
systematic studyof aphenomenon that plays an important role inour everyday life.41
Yet as we have seen, credentials provide a series of clear examples of theway a
single document act – for example entering a certain stamp into a hostel passbook
– can serve a plurality of performative ends. There emerges from our analysis of
credentials a distinction between two fundamental categories of our everyday
deontology, namely between “holding a right” and “having the deontic power to
exercise that right concretely”.
We believe that our analysis is significant also because, as paper and plastic
credentials give way to electronic credentials in your phone, or in an RFID chip
implanted in your earlobe, new types of uses for credentials are being invented that
are transforming modern societies, uses which involve execution by software.
Already credentials stored on your phone can enable you to get a loan, refill a
prescription, disclose your medical data, request a car and driver to be sent to your
current location, or take control over a car or bicycle or scooter that is left on the
street. At the same time, when you use these services the stored credentials will see
to it that your credit record/medical record/credit card account are automatically
updated accordingly.
As we saw in section 5.1 above, credentials were used already in Biblical times
as instruments to control migration flows. Reflecting on the Chinese invasion of
Tibet in the 1950s, Pallis (1985, 7) writes:
One of the side effects of modern technology has been to place in the hands of those who
control the machinery of government a range of coercive apparatus undreamed of by any
ancient despotism. It is not only such obvious means of intimidation as machine guns or
concentration camps that count; such a petty product of the printing press as an identity card,
by making it easy for the authorities to keep constant watch on everybody’s movements,
represents in the long run a still more effective curb on liberty. In Tibet, for instance, the
introduction of such a system by the Chinese Communists, following the abortive rising of
1959, and its application to food rationing has been one of the principal means of keeping the
41 Aswementioned in section 2.1, an important contribution to the ontology of credentials derives
from Searle’s research on “status indicators”. The present research on credentials can accordingly
also be viewed as a contribution to the ontological investigation of status indicators.
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whole population in subjection and compelling them to do the work decreed by their foreign
overlords.
With the growth and ubiquity of electronic credentials, the possibilities for such
control have of course increased by orders of magnitude. They will manifest
themselves both in good ways – for example in allowing more effective means of
controlling traffic flows by exploiting the credentials built into our car Wi-Fi and
autonomous driving systems–but also in badways, by enhancing the ability of the
state to control its citizens’ thought and behavior.
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